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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS:
IMPOSITION OF FILING FEES ON INDIGENTS
Ortwein v. Schwab, - Ore. -, 498 P.2d 757 (1972)
Petitioners sought judicial review after the Oregon State Welfare Divi-
sion reduced their welfare payments. Oregon law requires a twenty-five
dollar filing fee for judicial review of administrative decisions,' but pe-
titioners sought to have the filing fee waived because of their indigency.
The court of appeals refused to waive the fee, and petitioners sought a
writ of mandamus from the Oregon Supreme Court ordering the lower
court to accept their petition without payment of the fee. They argued
that the fee requirement2 violated the due process3 and equal protection 4
1. ORE. REV. STAT. § 21.010 (1965):
Filing and appearance fees on appeal. The appellant in a civil case, upon
taking an appeal to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, shall pay
the sum of $25 in the manner prescribed by ORS § 19.035 (1965). The re-
spondent in such case, upon entering his first appearance or filing his first
brief in the court, shall pay the clerk of the court the sum of $15. The party
entitled to costs and disbursements on such appeal shall recover from his
opponent the amount so paid.
Judicial review of administrative decisions that adversely affect individuals is pro-
vided by ORn. Rnv. STAT. § 183.480 (1965).
2. For an historical discussion of filing fee requirements and other court costs
in civil proceedings, see generally Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARv. L.
REV. 361 (1923); Willging, Financial Barriers and the Access of Indigents to the Courts,
57 GEo. L.J. 253 (1968); Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to tile Indigent,
56 GEo. LJ. 516 (1968).
3. No state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This concept of due process is based
on a concern that state action be fair. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954);
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Lisonba v. California, 314 U.S.
219, 236 (1941). The clause protects individuals from state action that would infringe
upon "the principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions." Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926). See also Palko
v. Connecticut 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105
(1934). The Supreme Court has established that due process requires at a minimum
that, absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance, "persons forced
to settle their claims. . . through the judicial process must be given a meaningful op-
portunity to be heard." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971). See also
Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 (1896).
4. Since judicial review is allowed by law, petitioners in Ortwein argued that the
equal protection clause requires that it be available to all, regardless of ability to pay
a fee. See, e.g., Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1971), where the court
of appeals held that, even though no constitutional right to counsel at a hearing for
revocation of mandatory early release existed, where a statute had been interpreted
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clauses of the fourteenth amendment.' The Oregon Supreme Court
held: The requirement that indigents pay a filing fee in order to obtain
judicial review of an adverse administrative ruling violates neither the
due process nor the equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment.'
The Supreme Court has developed two tests to determine the validity
of state statutes under the equal protection clause. At a minimum, a
statutory classification must bear some relationship to a legitimate
state purpose. 7 When the statutory classification infringes upon a "fun-
damental personal right" s or when the classifications are based on certain
"suspect" traits,' the Court has exercised a stricter scrutiny, requiring a
compelling state interest to sustain the classification. Absent a "funda-
mental personal right" or a "suspect" trait, the classification will not be
to afford a parolee an opportunity to be represented by retained counsel, equal pro-
tection prohibits denial of counsel because a parolee is financially unable to retain one.
5. Petitioners also argued that the fee was violative of their first amendment right
to "petition for redress." See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Vir-
ginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); United Mine Workers Dist. 12 v. Illniois State
Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967). The contention was summarily rejected as not rele-
vant because later decisions concerning access to the courts without paying filing fees
have not mentioned the first amendment. Ortwein v. Schwab, - Ore. -- -, 498 P.2d
757, 759 (1972).
The court dismissed petitioners' due process argument based on the state constitution,
ORE. CoNsT. art. 1, § 10, for the same reasons it dismissed the fourteenth amendment
due process argument. See discussion of Boddie accompanying notes 15-17 infra.
Finally, petitioner also argued that the court had the inherent common law power
to waive the fee requirement. The court, relying on Therkelsen v. Therkelsen, 35 Ore.
75, 54 P. 885 (1898), reasoned that its common law power to waive the fee was
nullified by the legislature's action in requiring it. But see Ferguson v. Keays, 4 Cal.
3d 649, 484 P.2d 70, 94 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1971); Martin v. Superior Court, 176 Cal.
289, 168 P. 135 (1917); O'Connor v. Matzdorf, 76 Wash. 2d 589, 458 P.2d 154
(1969).
6. Ortwein v. Schwab, - Ore. -, 498 P.2d 757 (1972).
7. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972); Morey v.
Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Williams v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
8. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel inter-
state); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (right to vote); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956) (right with respect to the criminal process); Skinner v. Oklahoma
ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate).
9. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) ("... classifications based
on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject
to close judicial scrutiny"); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 n.17 (1970) (the
Court impliedly limited "suspect" classifications to those "infected with a racially dis-
criminatory purpose or effect"). See also Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406
U.S. 164, 172 (1972).
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disturbed unless "palpably arbitrary"'" or "resting on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement" of some permissible state purpose."
It is well recognized that an indigent's access to the courts in criminal
cases may not be restricted because of inability to pay a fee or court
cost.' 2 That principle was first articulated in Griffin v. Illinois,'
where the Supreme Court held that a state law denying full appellate re-
view to persons convicted of a crime if they were unable to pay for a
transcript of a trial violated the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment.
In applying the equal protection clause to discriminatory practices in
criminal procedure, the Court has used language broad enough to cover
civil cases as well, but it has failed to do so.' 4 In Boddie v. Connecti-
cut,'" however, the Court decided that the imposition of filing fees on
indigents can violate the fourteenth amendment, but it based its holding
on the due process clause rather than the equal protection clause.'0 The
Court held that welfare recipients seeking a divorce need not pay statu-
tory filing fees for two reasons: the courts are the only available forum
to grant the relief sought; and a state's interest in reducing frivolous liti-
gation is not a countervailing state interest of overriding significance.' 7
10. International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U.S. 199, 215 (1914).
11. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
12. See Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458 (1969); Roberts v. LaVallee,
389 U.S. 40 (1967); Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966); Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963);
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
13. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
The Supreme Court has summarized the holdings of a direct line of cases from
Griffin to the present: "Our decisions have made it clear that the differences in access
to the instruments needed to vindicate legal rights, when based on the financial situa-
tion of the defendant, are repugnant to the Constitution." Roberts v. LaVallee, 389
U.S. 40, 42 (1967). Here the Court held that a requirement to pay five dollars per
one hundred words for a copy of a transcript of a public hearing in a criminal pro-
ceeding was a denial of equal protection.
14. For a discussion of the applicability of the Griffin-equal protection approach
to civil cases, see Willging, supra note 2, at 289; Note, Discrimination Against the Poor
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 HARv. L. REV. 435, 436-39 (1967).
15. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
16. Id. at 382-83. In an earlier case, the Supreme Court has held that the dismissal
of an answer to a complaint in a civil proceeding for inability to pay a court fee
violated due process. Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409 (1897).
17. 401 U.S. at 380. For a discussion of Boddie, see generally 51 NEB. L. REV.
367 (1972); 16 ST. Louis U.LJ. 328 (1971); 17 S.D.L. REv. 269 (1972).
The Ortwein court pointed out that the majority in Boddie had held that the state's
interest in reducing frivolous litigation and defraying the costs of operating the judi-
Washington University Open Scholarship
Vol. 1973:4621 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS 465
The Ortwein court followed the due process analysis of Boddie, but
distinguished the principal case on its facts. It reasoned that marital
status can be changed only by a court, regardless of any private agree-
ment or consent between the parties; in the principal case, "the State
Welfare Division can decrease petitioners' welfare payments,"" and
access to the courts is sought only for review of the administrative de-
cision.'" Although Boddie could have been decided by extending to
civil cases the equal protection principles developed in the line of cases
marked by Griffin,2 ° the Supreme Court granted relief in Boddie on due
process grounds without discussion of the equal protection arguments.
In Frederick v. Schwartz,21 the Supreme Court vacated and remanded,
in light of Boddie, a district court decision 22 upholding the imposition
of a filing fee on an indigent seeking judicial review of a welfare com-
mission's ruling against increased payments. In his dissent Justice Black
argued for outright reversal, reasoning that the Boddie decision made
access to the courts in all types of actions available to all on equal pro-
tection grounds, regardless of one's ability to pay a filing fee.23
ciary were not countervailing state interests of overriding significance. - Ore. at -,
498 P.2d at 759, citing Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 381 (1971). See also
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)
(state's interest in saving money is not a sufficient state interest to deny due process).
18. - Ore. at -, 498 P.2d at 760.
19. Id. at -, 498 P.2d at 760. The Ortwein court read Boddie strictly: it rea-
soned that if any means other than the courts is available for determining legal rights,
the Boddie decision is not controlling. But cf. Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co.,
402 U.S. 954, 960 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (courts may be the only available
forum for resolving not only divorce suits, but also many other legal disputes).
20. See LaFrance, Constitutional Law Reform for the Poor: Boddie v. Connecticut,
1971 DUKE L.J. 487. See also note 9 supra.
21. 402 U.S. 937 (1971).
22. 296 F. Supp. 1321 (1969). But cf. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971),
where the Court held that the termination of welfare benefits to an Aid for Dependent
Children recipient for failure to consent to a welfare official's entry into the recipients
home did not fall within the fourth amendment's proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures. But Justice Douglas, dissenting, argued that government "lar-
gesse," including welfare payments, is property. Id. at 390. This argument of Justice
Douglas is consistent with the petitioners' claim in Ortwein that the filing fee should
have been waived because its imposition deprived them of property without due process
of the law.
23. Frederick v. Schwartz, 402 U.S. 937, 955 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting):
In my view, the decision in Boddie v. Connecticut can rest safely on only one
crucial foundation-the civil courts of the United States and each of the states
belong to the people of this country and that no person can be denied access
to those courts, either for a trial or an appeal because he cannot pay a fee,
finance a bond, risk a penalty, or afford to hire an attorney.
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Justice Black's interpretation of Boddie has recently been repudiated
in United States v. Kras.14 The petitioner in Kras had filed a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy and, relying on Boddie, sought to have the filing
fee waived because of his indigency. The Court rejected any applica-
tion of the Boddie due process rationale to bankruptcy cases because the
settlement of debtor-creditor disputes, unlike the dissolution of marriage,
are capable of resolution without resort to the courts.26 The Court
also held that the fee requirement did not deny Kras the equal protection
of the laws because, since the right to a discharge in bankruptcy is not
a fundamental personal right,2" only a rational justification need be
shown for the fee requirement.2 7
The decisions in Boddie and Kras demonstrate the Court's unwilling-
ness to apply the Griffin-equal protection rationale to civil cases gener-
ally. Rather, the Court has adopted a case-by-case analysis of the un-
derlying substantive claims to determine whether a fundamental right is
involved,2" leaving open the possibility that filing fees may be a denial of
equal protection if a party is seeking access to the courts to vindicate
such an interest.
In Ortwein, the proper resolution of the petitioners' equal protection
argument appears to depend on whether receipt of welfare payments is a
fundamental right.29 If so, Oregon must demonstrate a compelling state
24. 93 S. Ct. 631 (1973). See also Huffman v. Boerson, 405 U.S. 951 (1972)
(Douglas J., dissenting); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971) (Douglas,
I., concurring).
25. "However unrealistic the remedy may be in a particular situation, a debtor, in
theory, and often in actuality, may adjust by negotiated agreement with his creditors."
93 S. Ct. at 638. But see O'Brien v. Treventhan, 336 F. Supp. 1029 (Conn. 1972);
In re Ottman, 336 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Wis. 1972); In re Smith, 323 F. Supp. 1082 (D.
Colo. 1971) (decided before Boddie).
26. 93 S. Ct. at 638.
27. The Court declared that the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Act demon-
strated that Congress intended to make the bankruptcy system self-sustaining and paid
for by those who use it. 93 S. Ct. at 639.
28. In declaring a discharge in bankruptcy not to be a fundamental right, the Court
contrasted it to "free speech or marriage," 93 S. Ct. at 638, implying that, had Boddie
been decided on equal protection grounds, the strict scrutiny test would have been
applied to the case because it involved the fundamental right of marriage.
29. It is also possible that wealth might be declared a suspect trait. There is
considerable dicta in opinions of the Court to the effect that wealth is indeed a sus-
pect trait. See McDonald v. Board of Election Comn'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969)
("And a careful examination. .. is especially warranted where lines are drawn on the
basis of wealth or race.. two factors which would independently render a classifica-
tion highly suspect . . ."); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668
(1966) ("Lines drawn on- the basis of wealth or property ... are traditionally dis-
['Vol. 1973:462
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interest, something beyond the rational justification actually shown.30
If the receipt of welfare benefits does not constitute a fundamental right,3 '
then the "rational justification" test applies and Ortwein was properly
decided.
favored"); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("The States ... are prohibited ... from discriminating between 'rich' and 'poor'
as such ... "). See also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-19 (1956); Edwards v.
California, 314 U.S. 160, 184-84 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring); Karst & Horowitz,
Reitman v. Mulkey: Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 39,
75 ("distinctions based on wealth-at least those that run against the poor-will no
doubt be assimilated to the race cases"). However, given the Court's recent pronounce-
ment of what constitutes a suspect trait, a determination that wealth is such a trait
is unlikely. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 n.17 (1970).
30. The Ortwein court held that the filing fee requirement tends to discourage
frivolous appeals and helps to financially support the state courts. Ortwein v. Schwab,
- Ore. -, -, 498 P.2d 757, 759 (1972), citing Frederick v. Schwartz, 296 F. Supp.
1321, 1322 (D. Conn. 1969).
31. The Ortwein court held that "the right to obtain judicial review of a ruling of
the State Welfare Division" is not a fundamental right. - Ore. at -, 498 P.2d at 761.
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